A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Minority Language Use in Multilingual Societies

  • José-Ramón Uriarte


To put this chapter into context, we begin by outlining the use of game-theoretic tools in the study of the economics of language.


Language Policy Basque Country Imperfect Information Minority Language Ultimatum Game 
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© José-Ramón Uriarte 2016

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  • José-Ramón Uriarte

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