Safety, Security and Multicore

  • Paul Parkinson
Conference paper


Historically many safety-related and security-critical systems have been developed and qualified using single-core processors. These platforms could easily meet their increases in system performance requirements through higher processor clock speeds. However, the industry is now approaching the limit of relatively simple upgrade path, and there is an increasing trend towards the adoption of multicore processor architectures in critical systems to address higher performance demands. In this paper, we will review the challenges involved in migration to multicore processor architectures and the specific challenges related to their use in safety-critical and security-sensitive systems.


Multicore Processor Covert Channel Multicore Architecture Technology Readiness Level Guest Operating System 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.


  1. Amdahl GM (1967) Validity of the single-processor approach to achieving large-scale computingGoogle Scholar
  2. capabilities. Proc Am Federation of Information Processing Societies Conf p483-485.Google Scholar
  3. AFIPS PressGoogle Scholar
  4. ARINC (2003) Avionics application software standard interface. ARINC Specification 653-1Google Scholar
  5. ASSC (2010) Allied Standards Avionics Architecture Council. Avionics Systems StandardisationGoogle Scholar
  6. Committee website. Accessed 9 August 2010
  7. Barnes J (2005) Safe and secure software – an invitation to Ada 2005. AdaCore. Accessed 9 August 2010
  8. Bate I, Conmy P, Kelly T, McDermid J (2001) Use of modern processors in safety-critical applications. The Computer Journal 44:531-543zbMATHCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Cullmann C, Ferdinand C, Gebhard G, Grund D, Maiza (Burguière) C, Reineke J, Triquet B, Wilhelm R (2010) Predictability considerations in the design of multi-core embedded systems. Embedded real-time systems and software conferenceGoogle Scholar
  10. DoD (1985) Trusted computer systems evaluation criteria, Department of Defense Standard 5200.28 (also known as Rainbow Series Orange Book). US Department of Defense. Accessed 9 August 2010
  11. Holton G (2007) BAE SYSTEMS military air solutions, UK MOD Military Avionics Technology Exhibition.Google Scholar
  12. ISO (2005) Common criteria for information technology security evaluation. ISO-15408 v3.1. Accessed 9 August 2010
  13. Kinnan L (2009) Use of multicore processors in avionics systems and its potential impact on implementation and certification. 28th digital avionics systems conferenceGoogle Scholar
  14. MAE (2010) First flight of carrier-based version of F-35 Joint Strike Fighter scheduled for this week. Military and Aerospace Electronics magazine, 3 JuneGoogle Scholar
  15. Mann P (2002) Cyber security ‘missing’ from travel defenses. Aviation Week and Space Technology 8 July 2002 p41Google Scholar
  16. NIAP (2007) US Government protection profile for separation kernels in environments requiring high robustness v1.03. National Information Assurance Partnership. http://www.niap-ccevs. org/pp/pp_skpp_hr_v1.03/. Accessed 20 September 2010
  17. NSA (2000) National security telecommunications and information systems security policy (NSTISSP) No. 11, National Security Agency Information Assurance Directorate. Accessed 9 August 2010
  18. Parkinson P, Baker A (2010) High assurance systems development using the MILS architecture., Wind River technical white paper. Accessed 9 August 2010
  19. Perry W (1994) Specifications and standards – a new way of doing business. US DOD Memorandum, 29 JuneGoogle Scholar
  20. Reagan R (1981) Executive Order 12333. The White House. Accessed 9 August 2010
  21. RTCA (1992) Software considerations in airborne systems and equipment certification. RTCA DO-178BGoogle Scholar
  22. RTCA (2000) Design assurance guidance for airborne electronic hardware. RTCA DO-254/Google Scholar
  23. EUROCAE ED-80Google Scholar
  24. RTCA (2005) Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA) development guidance and certification considerations.Google Scholar
  25. RTCA DO-297/EUROCAE ED-124 Rushby J (1984) A trusted computing base for embedded systems. Proceedings 7th DoD/NBS Computer Security Conference, Gaithersburg, Maryland p294-311.∼rushby/abstracts/ncsc84-tcb. Accessed 9 August 2010
  26. Wikipedia (2010a) Eurofighter Typhoon. Wikipedia. Accessed 9 August 2010
  27. Wikipedia (2010b) Blue Pill (malware). Wikipedia online encyclopedia. Accessed 9 August 2010
  28. Wikipedia (2010c) Moore’s Law. Wikipedia online encyclopedia.’27s_law. Accessed 9 August 2010
  29. Wind River (2004) Smiths Aerospace selects Wind River for use in Boeing 7E7 common core system. Wind River press release.
  30. Accessed 9 August 2010Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag London Limited 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Paul Parkinson
    • 1
  1. 1.Wind RiverSwindonUK

Personalised recommendations