Proof Burdens and Standards

  • Thomas F. Gordon
  • Douglas Walton

This chapter explains the role of proof burdens and standards in argumentation, illustrates them using legal procedures, and surveys the history of research on computational models of these concepts. It also presents an original computational model which aims to integrate the features of these prior systems.


Reasonable Doubt Argumentation Scheme Argumentation Framework Default Theory Proof Standard 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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We’d like to thank Trevor Bench-Capon and Henry Prakken for their helpful comments on various drafts of this article.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag US 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Fraunhofer FOKUSBerlinGermany
  2. 2.University of WindsorWindsorCanada

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