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Modeling And Detecting Anomalies In Scada Systems

  • Nils Svendsen
  • Stephen Wolthusen
Part of the The International Federation for Information Processing book series (IFIPAICT, volume 290)

The detection of attacks and intrusions based on anomalies is hampered by the limits of specificity underlying the detection techniques. However, in the case of many critical infrastructure systems, domain-specific knowledge and models can impose constraints that potentially reduce error rates. At the same time, attackers can use their knowledge of system behavior to mask their manipulations, causing adverse effects to observed only after a significant period of time. This paper describes elementary statistical techniques that can be applied to detect anomalies in critical infrastructure networks. A SCADA system employed in liquefied natural gas (LNG) production is used as a case study.

Keywords

SCADA systems anomaly detection multivariate analysis 

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Copyright information

© IFIP International Federation for Information Processing 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Nils Svendsen
    • 1
  • Stephen Wolthusen
    • 1
  1. 1.Gjovik University CollegeGjovikNorway

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