Game Theory Models and Their Applications in Inventory Management and Supply Chain

  • Altannar Chinchuluun
  • Athanasia Karakitsiou
  • Athanasia Mavrommati
Part of the Springer Optimization and Its Applications book series (SOIA, volume 17)

Analysis of supply chain politics can benefit from applying game-theory concepts extensively. Game theory tries to enlighten the interactions between individuals or groups of people whose goals are opposed conflicting, or at least partially competing. In this chapter, we review classic game theoretical approaches to modeling and solving certain problems in supply chain management. Both noncooperative and cooperative models are discussed and solution procedures are presented in single-period and multiperiod settings. As used here, a “game” is a metaphor for any interaction among the decision makers in a supply chain.


inventory supply chain noncooperative games cooperative games Nash equilibrium Stackelberg game transferable utility core bargaining biform games 


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© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Altannar Chinchuluun
    • 1
  • Athanasia Karakitsiou
    • 2
  • Athanasia Mavrommati
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Industrial and Systems EngineeringUniversity of FloridaGainesvilleUSA
  2. 2.Department of Production Engineering and ManagementTechnical University of CreteGreece

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