Lessons Learned from the Maroochy Water Breach
Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems are widely used to monitor and control operations in electrical power distribution facilities, oil and gas pipelines, water distribution systems and sewage treatment plants. Technological advances over the past decade have seen these traditionally closed systems become open and Internet-connected, which puts the service infrastructures at risk. This paper examines the response to the 2000 SCADA security incident at Maroochy Water Services in Queensland, Australia. The lessons learned from this incident are useful for establishing academic and industry-based research agendas in SCADA security as well as for safeguarding critical infrastructure components.
Keywords: SCADA security, Maroochy Water Services breach
KeywordsIntrusion Detection System Water Distribution System Critical Infrastructure Pump Station Security Solution
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