Detecting Non-Discoverable Bluetooth Devices

  • Daniel Cross
  • Justin Hoeckle
  • Michael Lavine
  • Jason Rubin
  • Kevin Snow
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-0-387-75462-8_20

Part of the IFIP International Federation for Information Processing book series (IFIPAICT, volume 253)
Cite this paper as:
Cross D., Hoeckle J., Lavine M., Rubin J., Snow K. (2008) Detecting Non-Discoverable Bluetooth Devices. In: Goetz E., Shenoi S. (eds) Critical Infrastructure Protection. ICCIP 2007. IFIP International Federation for Information Processing, vol 253. Springer, Boston, MA

Mobile communication technologies such as Bluetooth are becoming ubiquitous, but they must provide satisfactory levels of security and privacy. Concerns about Bluetooth device security have led the specification of the “non-discoverable” mode, which prevents devices from being listed during a Bluetooth device search process. However, a nondiscoverable Bluetooth device is visible to devices that know its address or can discover its address. This paper discusses the detection of non-discoverable Bluetooth devices using an enhanced brute force search attack. Our results indicate that the average time to attack a non-discoverable Bluetooth device using multiple search devices and condensed packet timing can be reduced to well under 24 hours.

Keywords: Bluetooth security, device discovery, non-discoverable mode

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Copyright information

© IFIP International Federation for Information Processing 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Daniel Cross
    • 1
  • Justin Hoeckle
    • 1
  • Michael Lavine
    • 1
  • Jason Rubin
    • 1
  • Kevin Snow
    • 1
  1. 1.Information Security InstituteHopkins UniversityBaltimoreUSA

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