The Emergence of Generalized Exchange by Indirect Reciprocity

  • Rie Mashima
  • Nobuyuki Takahashi

One of the characteristics that differentiate human beings from other species is their tendency to help non-kin even when there is no expectation of future interactions. Most religions consider such altruistic behavior a virtue at the highest level. In a society, such behavior constitutes generalized exchange. However, from the perspectives of social exchange theory, rational choice theory, and evolutionary theory, the existence of generalized exchange is a theoretical puzzle. How can generalized exchange exist? How does generalized exchange emerge, and how is it maintained? Recently, research in evolutionary biology has demonstrated that indirect reciprocity is the principle that makes generalized exchange possible. The first part of this chapter reviews recent theoretical studies on generalized exchange and concludes with the current debate on whether or not “to regard the enemy’s friend as an enemy” is necessary in order to maintain generalized exchange. The remainder will introduce our first attempt to empirically examine whether people actually have such a tendency to evaluate others.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Axelrod, R. (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.Google Scholar
  2. Axelrod, R. (1986). An evolutionary approach to norms. American Political Science Review, 80, 1095–1111.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Bolton, G. E., Katok, E., Ockenfels, A. (2005). Cooperation among strangers with limited information about reputation. Journal of Public Economics, 89, 1457–1468.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Brandt, H., Sigmund, K. (2004). The logic of reprobation: Assessment and action rules for indirect reciprocation. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 231, 475–486.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Hamilton, W. D. (1964). The genetic theory of social behavior. I and II. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 7, 1–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Hardin, G. (1982). Discriminating altruisms. Zygon, 17, 163–186.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Leimar, O., Hammerstein, P. (2001). Evolution of cooperation through indirect reciprocity. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London Series B: Biological Sciences, 268, 745–753.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Mashima, R., Takahashi, N. (2005a). The emergence of indirect reciprocity: Evolutionary foundation of altruistic behavior based on “strict discriminator”. The Japanese Journal of Psychology, 46, 436–444 (in Japanese).Google Scholar
  9. Mashima, R., Takahashi, N. (2005b). Is the enemy’s friend an enemy too?: Theoretical and empirical approach toward the effect of second-order information on indirect reciprocity. Sociological Theory and Methods, 20, 177–195 (in Japanese).Google Scholar
  10. Milinski, M., Semmann, D., Bakker, T. C. M., Krambeck, H. (2001). Cooperation through indirect reciprocity: image scoring or standing strategy? Proceedings of the Royal Society of London Series B: Biological Sciences, 268, 2495–2501.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Nowak, M. A., Sigmund, K. (1998a). Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring. Nature, 393, 573–577.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Nowak, M. A., Sigmund, K. (1998b). The dynamics of indirect reciprocity. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 194, 561–574.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Ohtsuki, H., Iwasa, Y. (2004). How should we define goodness?: Reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 231, 107–120.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Ohtsuki, H., Iwasa, Y. (2006). The leading eight: Social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 239, 435–444.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Oskamp, S. (1971). Effects of programmed strategies on cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma and other mixed-motive games. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 15, 225–229.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Panchanathan, K., Boyd, R. (2003). A tale of two defectors: The importance of standing in the evolution of indirect reciprocity. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 224, 115–126.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Sugden, R. (1986). The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.Google Scholar
  18. Takagi, E. (1996). The generalized exchange perspective on the evolution of altruism. In W. B. G. Liebrand & D. M. Messick (eds.), Frontiers in Social Dilemmas Research (pp. 311–336). Berlin: Springer-Verlag.Google Scholar
  19. Takahashi, N. (2000). The emergence of generalized exchange. American Journal of Sociology, 105, 1105–1134.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. Takahashi, N., Mashima, R. (2003). The emergence of indirect reciprocity: Is the standing strategy the answer? (COE Working Paper No. 29). Hokkaido, Japan: Hokkaido University, The Center for the Study of Cultural and Ecological Foundations of the Mind.Google Scholar
  21. Takahashi, N., Mashima, R. (2006). The importance of subjectivity in perceptual errors on the emergence of indirect reciprocity. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 243, 418–436.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. Takahashi, N., Yamagishi, T. (1996). Social relational foundations of altruistic behavior. Japanese Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 36, 1–11 (in Japanese).Google Scholar
  23. Trivers, R. (1971). The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Quarterly Review of Biology, 46, 35–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  24. Wedekind, C., Milinski, M. (2000). Cooperation through image scoring in humans. Science, 288, 850–852.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  25. Wilson, W. (1971). Reciprocation and other techniques for inducing cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 15, 167–195.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  26. Yamagishi, T. (1995). Social dilemmas. In K. S. Cook, G. Fine & J. House (eds.), Sociological Perspectives on Social Psychology (pp. 311–335). Boston: Allyn and Bacon.Google Scholar
  27. Yamagishi, T., Hayashi, N. (1996). Selective play: Social embeddedness of social dilemmas. In W. B. G. Liebrand & D. M. Messick (eds.), Frontiers in Social Dilemmas Research (pp. 363–384). Berlin: Springer-Verlag.Google Scholar
  28. Yamagishi, T., Takahashi, N. (1994). Evolution of norms without meta-norms. In U. Schulz, W. Albers & U. Mueller (eds.), Social Dilemmas and Cooperation (pp. 311–326). Berlin: Springer-Verlag.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Rie Mashima
    • 1
  • Nobuyuki Takahashi
    • 1
  1. 1.Hokkaido UniversityJapan

Personalised recommendations