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Towards a Generic e-Market Design

  • Dirk Neumann
  • Carsten Holtmann
  • Henning Weltzien
  • Christoph Lattemann
  • Christof Weinhardt
Part of the IFIP — The International Federation for Information Processing book series (IFIPAICT, volume 105)

Abstract

The design of the microstructure of electronic markets is crucial for their success. Less effort has been made in this area, especially for commodity markets. This paper illustrates five key problems of e-market design and introduces the concept of cascading dynamic market models as a promising solution to cope with most of them. Taking the multi-dimensional character of commodities into consideration, further research in this area is encouraged. Furthermore, the project ‘Electronic-Financial-Brokerage as knowledge intensive services — a generic approach’ dealing with those problems is briefly presented

Keywords

E-Market Design Parametric Design Market microstructure Market Server (Cascading) Dynamic Market Models 

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Copyright information

© IFIP International Federation for Information Processing 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Dirk Neumann
    • 1
  • Carsten Holtmann
    • 1
  • Henning Weltzien
    • 1
  • Christoph Lattemann
    • 1
  • Christof Weinhardt
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Economics and Business Engineering, Chair for Information Management and SystemsUniversitaet Karlsruhe (TH)KarlsruheGermany

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