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Because They Can

Motivations and Intent of White-Collar Criminals
  • James Gobert
  • Maurice Punch

Abstract

Why do high-status, eminently respected business executives and managers, earning handsome salaries and benefits, breach rules, violate the law, and engage in “deviant” behavior?1 Seemingly this group of violators has no financial “need” to turn to law-breaking. What then is their motivation? How do they justify their actions and how “conscious” are they of offending?

Keywords

Corporate Crime Regu Lators Corporate Criminal Liability Automatic Train Protection Mana Gement 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • James Gobert
  • Maurice Punch

There are no affiliations available

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