Pricing the Last Mile in the Postal Sector

  • Cátia Felisberto
  • Matthias Finger
  • Beat Friedli
  • Daniel Krähenbühl
  • Urs Trinkner
Part of the Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy book series (TREP, volume 49)

Abstract

This paper explores whether it would be commercially interesting for historical postal operators to price the “postal last mile”. By introducing the receiver pays principle it identifies an approach which could lead to a number of innovations in service arrangements and in financing the universal service obligation (USO).

Keywords

Price Elasticity Price Scheme Postal Operator Delivery Cost Flat Rate 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Cohen, R. and E.H. Chu. 1997. “A Measure of Scale Economies for Postal Systems.” In Managing Change in the Postal and Delivery Industries, edited by M.A. Crew and P.R. Kleindorfer. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.Google Scholar
  2. Crew, M.A. and P.R. Kleindorfer. 1991. “Rowland Hill’s Contribution as an Economist.” In Competition and Innovation in Postal Services, edited by M.A. Crew and P.R. Kleindorfer. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.Google Scholar
  3. De Donder, P., H. Cremer, J.P. Florens, A. Grimaud and F. Rodriguez. 2001. “Uniform Pricing and Postal Market Liberalization.” In Future Directions in Postal Reform, edited by M.A. Crew and P.R. Kleindorfer. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.Google Scholar
  4. Dietl, H.M., U. Trinkner, and R. Bleisch. 2005. “Liberalization and Regulation of the Swiss Letter Market.” In Regulatory and Economic Challenges in the Postal and Delivery Sector, edited by M.A. Crew and P.R. Kleindorfer. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.Google Scholar
  5. Doyle, C. and J.C. Smith. 1998. Market structure in mobile telecoms: qualified indirect access and the receiver pays principle. Information Economics and Policy 10: 471–488.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Elsenbast, W. 1996. Die Infrastrukturverpflichtung im Postbereich aus Nutzersicht. Diskussionbeitrag Nr. 162, WIK, Bad Honnef.Google Scholar
  7. Hemmeon, J.C. 1912. The History of the British Post Office. London, Henry Frowde.Google Scholar
  8. Hermalin, B.E. and M.L. Katz. 2004: “Sender or Receiver: who should pay to exchange an electronic message?” Rand Journal of Economics 35(3): 423–447.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Hill, R. and Hill, G.B. 1880: The Life of Sir Rowland Hill. London: Thos. De La Rue & Co.Google Scholar
  10. Jeon, D.S., J.J. Laffont, and J. Tirole. 2004. “On the Receiver Pays Principle.” Rand Journal of Economics 35(1): 85–110.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Kim, J.Y. and Y. Lim. 2000. “An Economic Analysis of the Receiver Pays Principle.” Information Economics and Policy 13: 231–260.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Owen, B. and R. Willig. 1981. Economics and postal pricing. In The Future of the Postal Service, edited by J. Fleishman. Aspen: The Aspen Institute.Google Scholar
  13. Schwarz-Schilling, C. 2001. Pricing Schemes in Liberalized Postal Markets. Presented at the Second Conference on “Competition and Universal Service in the Postal Sector,” Toulouse, December 6–7.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Cátia Felisberto
    • 1
  • Matthias Finger
    • 1
  • Beat Friedli
    • 2
  • Daniel Krähenbühl
    • 2
  • Urs Trinkner
    • 2
    • 3
  1. 1.Ecole Polytechnique Fédérate Lausanne (EPFL)Lausanne
  2. 2.Swiss PostSwitzerland
  3. 3.University of ZurichZurich

Personalised recommendations