The Value of Escalation and Incentives in Managing Information Access

  • Xia Zhao
  • M. Eric Johnson
Chapter

Abstract

Managing information access within large enterprises is increasingly challenging. With thousands of employees accessing thousands of applications and data sources, managers strive to ensure the employees can access the information they need to create value while protecting information from misuse. We examine an information governance approach based on controls and incentives, where employees’ self-interested behavior can result in firm-optimal use of information. Using insights gained from a game-theoretic model, we illustrate how an incentives-based policy with escalation can control both over and under-entitlementwhile maintaining the flexibility.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Xia Zhao
  • M. Eric Johnson

There are no affiliations available

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