Making Others Believe What They Want

  • Guido Boella
  • Célia Costa da Pereira
  • Andrea G. B. Tettamanzi
  • Leendert van der Torre
Part of the IFIP – The International Federation for Information Processing book series (IFIPAICT, volume 276)


We study the interplay between argumentation and belief revision within the MAS framework. When an agent uses an argument to persuade another one, he must consider not only the proposition supported by the argument, but also the overall impact of the argument on the beliefs of the addressee. Different arguments lead to different belief revisions by the addressee. We propose an approach whereby the best argument is defined as the one which is both rational and the most appealing to the addressee.


Belief Revision Belief Base Argumentation Framework Argument Base Prefer Extension 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© International Federation for Information Processing 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Guido Boella
    • 1
  • Célia Costa da Pereira
    • 2
  • Andrea G. B. Tettamanzi
    • 2
  • Leendert van der Torre
    • 3
  1. 1.Dipartimento di Informatica 10149Universita di TorinoTorinoItaly
  2. 2.Dip. Tecnologie dell’InformazioneUniversità degli Studi di MilanoCrema (CR)Italy
  3. 3.Computer Science and Communication L-1359 LuxembourgUniversité du LuxembourgLuxembourg

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