Electoral Competition in Mixed Systems of Representation

  • Ram Mudambi
  • Pietro Navarra
Chapter

Abstract

Over the last decade electoral engineers have become increasingly cognisant of three important facts that affect worldwide electoral institutions. First, several established democracies such as Israel, Italy, Japan, New Zealand and Venezuela undertook major electoral reforms. Second, the process of democratisation in formerly communist countries brought about constitutional reforms where the design of new systems of representation is the central concern. Third, mixed-member electoral (MM) systems have been the choice of the vast majority of countries implementing electoral reform.

Keywords

Electoral System Median Voter Vote Share Proportional Representation American Political Science Review 
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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ram Mudambi
  • Pietro Navarra

There are no affiliations available

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