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Security of 2t-Root Identification and Signatures

  • C. P. Schnorr
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 1109)

Abstract

Ong-Schnorr identification and signatures are variants of the Fiat-Shamir scheme with short and fast communication and signatures. This scheme uses secret keys that are 2t-roots modulo N of the public keys, whereas Fiat-Shamir uses square roots modulo N. Security for particular cases has recently been proved by Micali [M94] and Shoup [Sh96].

We prove that identification and signatures are secure for arbitrary moduli N = pq unless N can easily be factored. The proven security of identification against active impersonation attacks depends on the maximal 2-power 2m that divides either p − 1 or q − 1. We show that signatures are secure against adaptive chosen-message attacks. This proves the security of a very efficient signature scheme.

Keywords

identification signature Fiat-Shamir scheme active/passive impersonation attacks adaptive chosen-message attack random oracle model factoring of integers 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1996

Authors and Affiliations

  • C. P. Schnorr
    • 1
  1. 1.Fachbereich Mathematik/InformatikUniversität FrankfurtFrankfurt/MainGermany

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