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Multi-Authority Secret-Ballot Elections with Linear Work

  • Ronald Cramer
  • Matthew Franklin
  • Berry Schoenmakers
  • Moti Yung
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 1070)

Abstract

We present new cryptographic protocols for multi-authority secret ballot elections that guarantee privacy, robustness, and univer- sal verifiability. Application of some novel techniques, in particular the construction of witness hiding/indistinguishable protocols from Cramer, Damgård and Schoenmakers, and the verifiable secret sharing scheme of Pedersen, reduce the work required by the voter or an authority to a linear number of cryptographic operations in the population size (com- pared to quadratic in previous schemes). Thus we get significantly closer to a practical election scheme.

Keywords

Discrete Logarithm Vote Scheme Bulletin Board Discrete Logarithm Problem Commitment Scheme 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1996

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ronald Cramer
    • 1
  • Matthew Franklin
    • 2
  • Berry Schoenmakers
    • 3
  • Moti Yung
    • 4
  1. 1.CWIAmsterdamThe Netherlands
  2. 2.AT&T Bell Labs.Murray HillUSA
  3. 3.DigiCash bvAmsterdamThe Netherlands
  4. 4.IBM T.J. Watson Research CenterYorktown HeightsUSA

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