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Hiding Routing information

  • David M. Goldschlag
  • Michael G. Reed
  • Paul F. Syverson
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 1174)

Abstract

This paper describes an architecture, Onion Routing, that limits a network's vulnerability to traffic analysis. The architecture provides anonymous socket connections by means of proxy servers. It provides real-time, bi-directional, anonymous communication for any protocol that can be adapted to use a proxy service. Specifically, the architecture provides for bi-directional communication even though no-one but the initiator's proxy server knows anything but previous and next hops in the communication chain. This implies that neither the respondent nor his proxy server nor any external observer need know the identity of the initiator or his proxy server. A prototype of Onion Routing has been implemented. This prototype works with HTTP (World Wide Web) proxies. In addition, an analogous proxy for TELNET has been implemented. roxies for FTP and SMTP are under development.

Keywords

Stream Cipher Proxy Server Expiration Time Traffic Analysis Phone Line 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1996

Authors and Affiliations

  • David M. Goldschlag
    • 1
  • Michael G. Reed
    • 1
  • Paul F. Syverson
    • 1
  1. 1.Naval Research LaboratoryCenter For High Assurance Computer SystemsWashington, D.C.USA

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