Non-interactive generation of shared pseudorandom sequences

  • Manuel Cerecedo
  • Tsutomu Matsumoto
  • Hideki Imai
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 718)

Abstract

We address the following problem: given a random seed secretly shared among a group of individuals, non-interactively generate pieces corresponding to a much longer shared pseudorandom sequence. Shared randomness is an essential resource in distributed computing and non-interactive ways of generating it can be useful in applications such as Byzantine Agreement, common coin flipping or secure computation protocols.

Our first result is negative: well known cryptographically strong pseudorandom number generators cannot be evaluated without interaction and, in particular, it is shown that constructions that recursively apply a one-way function to a random seed and output at each iteration the simultaneously hard bits in the input of the one-way function are actually incompatible with a homomorphic evaluation.

On the other hand, we show that pseudorandom generators that can be both proven cryptographically strong and sharedly evaluated without interaction do exist. A concrete implementation, under the RSA assumption, is described.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 1993

Authors and Affiliations

  • Manuel Cerecedo
    • 1
  • Tsutomu Matsumoto
    • 1
  • Hideki Imai
    • 2
  1. 1.Division of Electrical and Computer EngineeringYokohama National UniversityYokohamaJapan
  2. 2.Institute of Industrial ScienceUniversity of TokyoTokyoJapan

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