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How to Enhance the Security of Public-Key Encryption at Minimum Cost

  • Eiichiro Fujisaki
  • Tatsuaki Okamoto
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 1560)

Abstract

This paper presents a simple and efficient conversion from a semantically secure public-key encryption scheme against passive adversaries to a non-malleable (or semantically secure) public-key encryption scheme against adaptive chosenciphertext attacks (active adversaries) in the random oracle model. Since our conversion requires only one random (hash) function operation, the converted scheme is almost as efficient as the original one, when the random function is replaced by a practical hash function such as SHA-1 and MD5. We also give a concrete analysis of the reduction for proving its security, and show that our security reduction is (almost) optimally efficient. Finally this paper gives some practical examples of applying this conversion to some practical and semantically secure encryption schemes such as the ElGamal, Blum-Goldwasser and Okamoto-Uchiyama schemes [4,7,9].

Keywords

Encryption Scheme Random Oracle Random Oracle Model Challenge Ciphertext Decryption Oracle 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1999

Authors and Affiliations

  • Eiichiro Fujisaki
    • 1
  • Tatsuaki Okamoto
    • 1
  1. 1.NTT LaboratoriesYokosuka-shiJapan

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