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On the Security of RSA Screening

  • Jean -Sebastien Coron
  • David Naccache
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 1560)

Abstract

Since many applications require the verification of large sets of signatures, it is sometimes advantageous to perform a simultaneous verification instead of checking each signature individually. The simultaneous processing, called batching, must be provably equivalent to the sequential verification of all signatures.

In eurocrypt’98, Bellare et al. [1] presented a fast RSA batch verification scheme, called screening. Here we successfully attack this algorithm by forcing it to accept a false signature and repair it by implementing an additional test.

Keywords

Hash Function Signature Scheme Random Oracle Security Proof Random Oracle Model 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1999

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jean -Sebastien Coron
    • 1
    • 2
  • David Naccache
    • 2
  1. 1.Ecole Normale SuperieureParisFrance
  2. 2.Gemplus Card InternationalIssy-les-MoulineauxFrance

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