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An Efficient threshold Public Key Cryptosystem Secure Against Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack (Extended Abstract)

  • Ran Canetti
  • Shafi Goldwasser
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 1592)

Abstract

This paper proposes a simple threshold Public-Key Cryptosystem (PKC) which is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack, under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) intractability assumption.

Previously, it was shown how to design non-interactive threshold PKC secure under chosen ciphertext attack, in the random-oracle model and under the DDH intractability assumption [25]. The random-oracle was used both in the proof of security and to eliminate interaction. General completeness results for multi-party computations [6,13] enable in principle converting any single server PKC secure against CCA (e.g., [19,17]) into a threshold one, but the conversions are inefficient and require much interaction among the servers for each ciphertext decrypted. The recent work by Cramer and Shoup [17] on single server PKC secure against adaptive CCA is the starting point for the new proposal.

Keywords

Random Oracle Choose Ciphertext Attack Partial Decryption Adaptive Choose Ciphertext Attack Faulty Server 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1999

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ran Canetti
    • 1
  • Shafi Goldwasser
    • 2
  1. 1.IBM T. J. Watson Research CenterYorktown HeightUSA
  2. 2.Laboratory for Computer ScienceMassachusetts Institute of TechnologyCambridgeUSA

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