The Operational Semantics of a Java Secure Processor

  • Pieter H. Hartel
  • Michael J. Butler
  • Moshe Levy
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 1523)


A formal specification of a Java Secure Processor is presented, which is mechanically checked for type consistency, well formedness and operational conservativity. The specification is executable and it is used to animate and study the behaviour of sample Java programs. The purpose of the semantics is to document the behaviour of the complete JSP for the benefit of implementors.


Virtual Machine Smart Card Operational Semantic Java Program Side Condition 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1999

Authors and Affiliations

  • Pieter H. Hartel
    • 1
  • Michael J. Butler
    • 1
  • Moshe Levy
    • 2
  1. 1.Dept. of Electronics and Computer ScienceUniv. of SouthamptonUK
  2. 2.JavaSoft, Inc. A Sun Microsystems, Inc BusinessPalo AltoUSA

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