Extending Social Reasoning to Cope with Multiple Partner Coalitions

  • Nuno David
  • Jaime Simão Sichman
  • Helder Coelho
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 1647)


We present a utility-driven rationality and a complementary-driven rationality based model, relative to multiple partner coalitions, motivated by relations of dependence and instrumental goal adoption. For this purpose, we analyze social dependency patterns and its corresponding dependency networks. The networks are used as a source of quantitative and qualitative information with which an agent is able to choose the best set of partners and adequate proposals to form coalitions. An e-commerce example is presented, showing the usefulness of the mechanism in real world multi-agent systems.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1999

Authors and Affiliations

  • Nuno David
    • 1
  • Jaime Simão Sichman
    • 2
  • Helder Coelho
    • 3
  1. 1.Department of Information and Technology SciencesISCTE/DCTILisbonPortugal
  2. 2.LTI/PCS/EP/USPUniversity of São PauloSão PauloBrazil
  3. 3.DI/FC/ULUniversity of LisbonLisbonPortugal

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