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Secure Integration of Asymmetric and Symmetric Encryption Schemes

  • Eiichiro Fujisaki
  • Tatsuaki Okamoto
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 1666)

Abstract

This paper shows a generic and simple conversion from weak asymmetric and symmetric encryption schemes into an asymmetric encryption scheme which is secure in a very strong sense — indistinguishability against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks in the random oracle model. In particular, this conversion can be applied efficiently to an asymmetric encryption scheme that provides a large enough coin space and, for every message, many enough variants of the encryption, like the ElGamal encryption scheme.

Keywords

Encryption Scheme Random Oracle Authentication Code Random Oracle Model Symmetric Encryption 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1999

Authors and Affiliations

  • Eiichiro Fujisaki
    • 1
  • Tatsuaki Okamoto
    • 1
  1. 1.NTT LaboratoriesYokosuka-shiJapan

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