Towards Sound Approaches to Counteract Power-Analysis Attacks

  • Suresh Chari
  • Charanjit S. Jutla
  • Josyula R. Rao
  • Pankaj Rohatgi
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 1666)


Side channel cryptanalysis techniques, such as the analysis of instantaneous power consumption, have been extremely effective in attacking implementations on simple hardware platforms. There are several proposed solutions to resist these attacks, most of which are ad—hoc and can easily be rendered ineffective. A scientific approach is to create a model for the physical characteristics of the device, and then design implementations provably secure in that model, i.e, they resist generic attacks with an a priori bound on the number of experiments. We propose an abstract model which approximates power consumption in most devices and in particular small single—chip devices. Using this, we propose a generic technique to create provably resistant implementations for devices where the power model has reasonable properties, and a source of randomness exists. We prove a lower bound on the number of experiments required to mount statistical attacks on devices whose physical characteristics satisfy reasonable properties.


Power Consumption Relevant State Side Channel Statistical Attack Instantaneous Power 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1999

Authors and Affiliations

  • Suresh Chari
    • 1
  • Charanjit S. Jutla
    • 1
  • Josyula R. Rao
    • 1
  • Pankaj Rohatgi
    • 1
  1. 1.I.B.M. Thomas J. Watson Research CenterYorktown HeightsUSA

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