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Differential Power Analysis

  • Paul Kocher
  • Joshua Jaffe
  • Benjamin Jun
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 1666)

Abstract

Cryptosystem designers frequently assume that secrets will be manipulated in closed, reliable computing environments. Unfortunately, actual computers and microchips leak information about the operations they process. This paper examines specific methods for analyzing power consumption measurements to find secret keys from tamper resistant devices. We also discuss approaches for building cryptosystems that can operate securely in existing hardware that leaks information.

Keywords

differential power analysis DPA SPA cryptanalysis DES 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1999

Authors and Affiliations

  • Paul Kocher
    • 1
  • Joshua Jaffe
    • 1
  • Benjamin Jun
    • 1
  1. 1.Cryptography Research, Inc.San FranciscoUSA

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