Anonymous Investing: Hiding the Identities of Stockholders

  • Philip MacKenzie
  • Jeffrey Sorensen
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 1648)

Abstract

This paper introduces the concept of an eshare, or digi- tal stockholder certificate, which allows investors in companies to buy and trade shares without revealing their identity or the size of their investment. In addition, the eshare protocols presented allow for pub- licly verifiable elections to be held with each share assigned one vote. Dividend payments to investors are also supported, again without re- vealing shareholder identities, even if a government taxation agency re- quires verifiable documentation of shareholder earnings. The protocols presented are based on certified anonymous public keys with trustee- revocable anonymity, which may be of independent interest.

Keywords

Blind Signature Dividend Payment True Identity Investment Income Electronic Vote 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1999

Authors and Affiliations

  • Philip MacKenzie
    • 1
  • Jeffrey Sorensen
    • 2
  1. 1.Information Sciences Research CenterBell LaboratoriesMurray HillNJ
  2. 2.T. J. Watson Research CenterIBM CorporationYorktown HeightsNY

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