Noninterference for Concurrent Programs

  • Gérard Boudol
  • Ilaria Castellani
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 2076)


We propose a type system to ensure the property of noninterference in a system of concurrent programs, described in a standard imperative language extended with parallelism. Our proposal is in the line of some recent work by Irvine, Volpano and Smith. Our type system, as well as our semantics for concurrent programs, seem more natural and less restrictive than those originally presented by these authors. Moreover, we show how to adapt the type system in order to preserve the noninterference results in the presence of scheduling policies, while remaining in a nonprobabilistic setting.


Type System Schedule Policy Security Level Operational Semantic Concurrent Program 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Gérard Boudol
    • 1
  • Ilaria Castellani
    • 1
  1. 1.INRIASophia-AntipolisFrance

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