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Probing Attacks On Tamper-Resistant Devices

  • Helena Handschuh
  • Pascal Paillier
  • Jacques Stern
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 1717)

Abstract

This paper describes a new type of attack on tamper-resistant cryptographic hardware. We show that by locally observing the value of a few RAM or adress bus bits (possibly a single one) during the execution of a cryptographic algorithm, typically by the mean of a probe (needle), an attacker could easily recover information on the secret key being used; our attacks apply to public-key cryptosystems such as RSA or El Gamal, as well as to secret-key encryption schemes including DES and RC5.

Keywords

Block Cipher Cryptographic Algorithm Round Function Modular Exponentiation Linear Cryptanalysis 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1999

Authors and Affiliations

  • Helena Handschuh
    • 1
  • Pascal Paillier
    • 1
  • Jacques Stern
    • 2
  1. 1.Gemplus/ENSTFrance
  2. 2.Ecole Normale SupérieureFrance

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