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Power Analysis Attacks of Modular Exponentiation in Smartcards

  • Thomas S. Messerges
  • Ezzy A. Dabbish
  • Robert H. Sloan
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 1717)

Abstract

Three new types of power analysis attacks against smartcard implementations of modular exponentiation algorithms are described. The first attack requires an adversary to exponentiate many random messages with a known and a secret exponent. The second attack assumes that the adversary can make the smartcard exponentiate using exponents of his own choosing. The last attack assumes the adversary knows the modulus and the exponentiation algorithm being used in the hardware. Experiments show that these attacks are successful. Potential countermeasures are suggested.

Keywords

Power Signal Advance Encryption Standard Modular Multiplication Modular Exponentiation Power Bias 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1999

Authors and Affiliations

  • Thomas S. Messerges
    • 1
  • Ezzy A. Dabbish
    • 1
  • Robert H. Sloan
    • 2
  1. 1.Motorola LabsMotorolaSchaumburg
  2. 2.Dept. of EE and Computer ScienceUniversity of Illinois at ChicagoChicago

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