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Provably Secure Distributed Schnorr Signatures and a (t, n) Threshold Scheme for Implicit Certificates

  • Douglas R. Stinson
  • Reto Strobl
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 2119)

Abstract

In a (t, n) threshold digital signature scheme, t out of n signers must co-operate to issue a signature. We present an efficient and robust (t, n) threshold version of Schnorr’s signature scheme. We prove it to be as secure as Schnorr’s signature scheme, i.e., existentially unforgeable under adaptively chosen message attacks. The signature scheme is then incorporated into a (t,n) threshold scheme for implicit certificates. We prove the implicit certificate scheme to be as secure as the distributed Schnorr signature scheme.

Keywords

Signature Scheme Threshold Scheme Discrete Logarithm Problem Random Oracle Model Random Tape 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Douglas R. Stinson
    • 1
    • 2
  • Reto Strobl
    • 3
  1. 1.Certicom CorporationMississauga ONCanada
  2. 2.Department of Combinatorics and OptimizationUniversity of WaterlooWaterloo OntarioCanada
  3. 3.Department of Computer ScienceSwiss Federal Institute of TechnologySwitzerland

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