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Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge and Chosen Ciphertext Attack

  • Charles Rackoff
  • Daniel R. Simon
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 576)

Abstract

The zero-knowledge proof of knowledge, first defined by Fiat, Fiege and Shamir, was used by Galil, Haber and Yung as a means of constructing (out of a trapdoor function) an interactive public-key cryptosystem provably secure against chosen ciphertext attack. We introduce a revised setting which permits the definition of a non-interactive analogue, the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge, and show how it may be constructed in that setting from a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system for N P (of the type introduced by Blum, Feldman and Micali). We give a formalization of chosen ciphertext attack in our model which is stronger than the “lunchtime attack” considered by Naor and Yung, and prove a non-interactive public-key cryptosystem based on non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge to be secure against it.

Keywords

Signature Scheme Proof System Digital Signature Scheme Choose Ciphertext Attack Trapdoor Function 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

References

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1992

Authors and Affiliations

  • Charles Rackoff
    • 1
  • Daniel R. Simon
    • 1
  1. 1.Dept. of Computer ScienceUniversity of TorontoTorontoCanada

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