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Making Rational Decisions in N-by-N Negotiation Games with a Trusted Third Party

  • Shih-Hung Wu
  • Von-Wun Soo
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 1733)

Abstract

The optimal decision for an agent in a given game situation depends on the decisions of other agents at the same time. Rational agents will find a stable equilibrium before taking an action, according to the assumption of rationality. We suggest that the rational agents can use the negotiation mechanism to reach the equilibrium. In previous works, we proposed the communication actions of guarantee and compensation to convince or persuade other agents with a trusted third party mediating the games. In this paper, we extend the negotiation mechanism to deal with n-by-n games and justify its optimality with the underlying assumptions. During the negotiation process, each agent makes suggestions on how they can reach equilibrium while maximizing its own payoff. The mechanism can deal with all the game situations and find an acceptable equilibrium that gives optimal payoffs for the agents.

Keywords

Nash Equilibrium Multiagent System Game Matrix Negotiation Protocol Negotiation Game 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1999

Authors and Affiliations

  • Shih-Hung Wu
    • 1
  • Von-Wun Soo
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceNational Tsing Hua University Hsin-Chu CityR.O.CTaiwan

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