A Top-Down Look at a Secure Message

  • Martín Abadi
  • Cédric Fournet
  • Georges Gonthier
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 1738)

Abstract

In ongoing work, we are investigating the design of secure distributed implementations of high-level process calculi (in particular, of the join-calculus). We formulate implementations as translations to lower-level languages with cryptographic primitives. Cryptographic protocols are essential components of those translations. In this paper we discuss basic cryptographic protocols for transmitting a single datum from one site to another. We explain some sufficient correctness conditions for these protocols. As an example, we present a simple protocol and a proof of its correctness.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1999

Authors and Affiliations

  • Martín Abadi
    • 1
  • Cédric Fournet
    • 2
  • Georges Gonthier
    • 3
  1. 1.Bell Labs ResearchLucent TechnologiesUSA
  2. 2.Microsoft ResearchUSA
  3. 3.INRIA RocquencourtUSA

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