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Formal System Development with KIV

  • Michael Balser
  • Wolfgang Reif
  • Gerhard Schellhorn
  • Kurt Stenzel
  • Andreas Thums
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 1783)

Abstract

KIV is a tool for formal systems development. It can be employed, e.g.,
  1. for the development of safety critical systems from formal requirements specifications to executable code, including the verification of safety requirements and the correctness of implementations,

     
  2. for semantical foundations of programming languages from a specification of the semantics to a verified compiler,

     
  3. for building security models and architectural models as they are needed for high level ITSEC [7] or CC [1] evaluations.

     

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • Michael Balser
    • 1
  • Wolfgang Reif
    • 1
  • Gerhard Schellhorn
    • 1
  • Kurt Stenzel
    • 1
  • Andreas Thums
    • 1
  1. 1.Abt. ProgrammiermethodikUniversität UlmUlmGermany

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