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An Efficient Dynamic and Distributed Cryptographic Accumulator*

  • Michael T. Goodrich
  • Roberto Tamassia
  • Jasminka Hasić
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 2433)

Abstract

We show how to use the RSA one-way accumulator to realize an efficient and dynamic authenticated dictionary, where untrusted directories provide cryptographically verifiable answers to membership queries on a set maintained by a trusted source. Our accumulator-based scheme for authenticated dictionaries supports efficient incremental updates of the underlying set by insertions and deletions of elements. Also, the user can optimally verify in constant time the authenticity of the answer provided by a directory with a simple and practical algorithm. This work has applications to certificate revocation in public key infrastructure and end-to-end integrity of data collections published by third parties on the Internet.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Michael T. Goodrich
    • 1
  • Roberto Tamassia
    • 2
  • Jasminka Hasić
    • 2
  1. 1.Dept. Information & Computer ScienceUniversity of CaliforniaIrvine
  2. 2.Dept. Computer ScienceBrown UniversityProvidenceRhode Island

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