GEM: A Generic Chosen-Ciphertext Secure Encryption Method
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This paper proposes an efficient and provably secure transform to encrypt a message with any asymmetric one-way cryptosystem. The resulting scheme achieves adaptive chosen-ciphertext security in the random oracle model.
Compared to previous known generic constructions (Bellare, Rogaway, Fujisaki, Okamoto, and Pointcheval), our embedding reduces the encryption size and/or speeds up the decryption process. It applies to numerous cryptosystems, including (to name a few) ElGamal, RSA, Okamoto- Uchiyama and Paillier systems.
KeywordsPublic-key encryption hybrid encryption chosen-ciphertext security random oracle model generic conversion block ciphers stream ciphers
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