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Separating Random Oracle Proofs from Complexity Theoretic Proofs: The Non-committing Encryption Case

  • Jesper Buus Nielsen
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 2442)

Abstract

We show that there exists a natural protocol problem which has a simple solution in the random-oracle (RO) model and which has no solution in the complexity-theoretic (CT) model, namely the problem of constructing a non-interactive communication protocol secure against adaptive adversaries a.k.a. non-interactive non-committing encryption. This separation between the models is due to the so-called programability of the random oracle. We show this by providing a formulation of the RO model in which the oracle is not programmable, and showing that in this model, there does not exist non-interactive non-committing encryption.

Keywords

Encryption Scheme Secure Protocol Random Oracle Ideal Functionality Probabilistic Polynomial Time 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jesper Buus Nielsen
    • 1
  1. 1.BRICS Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of AarhusArhus CDenmark

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