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On Name Generation and Set-Based Analysis in the Dolev-Yao Model

  • Roberto M. Amadio
  • Witold Charatonik
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 2421)

Abstract

We study the control reachability problem in the Dolev-Yao model of cryptographic protocols when principals are represented by tail recursive processes with generated names. We propose a conservative approximation of the problem by reduction to a non-standard collapsed operational semantics and we introduce checkable syntactic conditions entailing the equivalence of the standard and the collapsed semantics. Then we introduce a conservative and decidable set-based analysis of the collapsed operational semantics and we characterize a situation where the analysis is exact.

Keywords

cryptographic protocols name generation verification set constraints 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Roberto M. Amadio
    • 1
  • Witold Charatonik
    • 2
    • 3
  1. 1.Laboratoire d’Informatique FondamentaleMarseille
  2. 2.Max-Planck-Institut für InformatikSaarbrücken
  3. 3.Uniwersytet WrocławskiWrocław

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