On the Security of Randomized CBC-MAC Beyond the Birthday Paradox Limit A New Construction
In this paper, we study the security of randomized CBC-MACs and propose a new construction that resists birthday paradox attacks and provably reaches full security. The size of the MAC tags in this construction is optimal, i.e., exactly twice the size of the block cipher. Up to a constant, the security of the proposed randomized CBC-MAC using an n-bit block cipher is the same as the security of the usual encrypted CBC-MAC using a 2n-bit block cipher. Moreover, this construction adds a negligible computational overhead compared to the cost of a plain, non-randomized CBC-MAC. We give a full standard proof of our construction using one pass of a block-cipher with 2n-bit keys but there also is a proof for n-bit keys block-ciphers in the random oracle model.
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