A Time-Memory Tradeoff Attack Against LILI-128
In this note we discuss a novel and simple time-memory tradeoff attack against the stream cipher LILI-128. The attack defeats the security advantage of having an irregular stepping function. The attack requires 246 bits of keystream, a lookup table of 245 89-bit words and computational effort which is roughly equivalent to 248 DES operations.
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