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Security Analysis of the Gennaro-Halevi-Rabin Signature Scheme

  • Jean-Sébastien Coron
  • David Naccache
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 1807)

Abstract

We exhibit an attack against a signature scheme recently proposed by Gennaro, Halevi and Rabin [9]. The scheme’s security is based on two assumptions namely the strong RSA assumption and the existence of a division-intractable hash-function. For the latter, the authors conjectured a security level exponential in the hash-function’s digest size whereas our attack is sub-exponential with respect to the digest size. Moreover, since the new attack is optimal, the length of the hash function can now be rigorously fixed. In particular, to get a security level equivalent to 1024-bit RSA, one should use a digest size of approximately 1024 bits instead of the 512 bits suggested in [9].

Keywords

Hash Function Signature Scheme Security Level Random Oracle Common Multiple 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jean-Sébastien Coron
    • 1
  • David Naccache
    • 2
  1. 1.Ecole Normale SupérieureParisFrance
  2. 2.Gemplus Card InternationalIssy-les-MoulineauxFrance

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