Advanced Slide Attacks

Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 1807)


Recently a powerful cryptanalytic tool—the slide attack—was introduced [3]. Slide attacks are very successful in breaking iterative ciphers with a high degree of self-similarity and even more surprisingly are independent of the number of rounds of a cipher. In this paper we extend the applicability of slide attacks to a larger class of ciphers. We find very efficient known- and chosen-text attacks on generic Feistel ciphers with a periodic key-schedule with four independent subkeys, and consequently we are able to break a DES variant proposed in [2] using just 128 chosen texts and negligible time for the analysis (for one out of every 216 keys). We also describe known-plaintext attacks on DESX and Even-Mansour schemes with the same complexity as the best previously known chosen-plaintext attacks on these ciphers. Finally, we provide new insight into the design of GOST by successfully analyzing a 20-round variant (GOST⊕) and demonstrating weak key classes for all 32 rounds.


Block Cipher Round Function Plaintext Attack Choose Plaintext Attack Pseudorandom Permutation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Applied Mathematics DepartmentTechnion - Israel Institute of TechnologyHaifaIsrael
  2. 2.Computer Science DepartmentThe Weizmann Institute of ScienceRehovotIsrael
  3. 3.University of CaliforniaBerkeley

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