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A New Logic for Electronic Commerce Protocols

  • Kamel Adi
  • Mourad Debbabi
  • Mohamed Mejri
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 1816)

Abstract

The primary objective of this paper is to present the definition of a new dynamic, linear and modal logic for security protocols. The logic is compact, expressive and formal. It allows the specification of classical security properties (authentication, secrecy and integrity) and also electronic commerce properties (non-repudiation, anonymity, good atomicity, money atomicity, certified delivery, etc.). The logic constructs are interpreted over a trace-based model. Traces reflect valid protocol executions in the presence of a malicious smart intruder. The logic is endowed with a tableau-based proof system that leads to a modular denotational semantics.

Keywords

Modal Logic Security Protocol Security Property Cryptographic Protocol Denotational Semantic 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • Kamel Adi
    • 1
  • Mourad Debbabi
    • 1
  • Mohamed Mejri
    • 1
  1. 1.LSFM Research Group, Computer Science DepartmentLaval UniversityCanada

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