Simple Negotiating Agents in Complex Games: Emergent Equilibria and Dominance of Strategies

  • Peyman Faratin
  • Mark Klein
  • Hiroki Sayama
  • Yaneer Bar-Yam
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 2333)


We present a simple model of distributed multi-agent multi-issued contract negotiation for open systems where interactions are competitive and information is private and not shared. We then investigate via simulations two different approximate optimization strategies and quantify the contribution and costs of each towards the quality of the solutions reached. To evaluate the role of knowledge the obtained results are compared to more cooperative strategies where agents share more information. Interesting social dilemmas emerge that suggest the design of incentive mechanisms.


Utility Function Multiagent System Nash Bargaining Solution Negotiation Protocol Local Utility 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Peyman Faratin
    • 1
  • Mark Klein
    • 1
  • Hiroki Sayama
    • 2
  • Yaneer Bar-Yam
    • 2
  1. 1.Sloan School of ManagementCenter for Coordination Science, MITCambridgeUSA
  2. 2.New England Complex Systems InstituteCambridgeUSA

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