ElectroMagnetic Analysis (EMA): Measures and Counter-measures for Smart Cards

  • Jean-Jacques Quisquater
  • David Samyde
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 2140)


A processor can leak information by different ways [1], electromagnetic radiations could be one of them. This idea, was first introduced by Kocher, with timing and power measurements. Here we developed the continuation of his ideas by measuring the field radiated by the processor. Therefore we show that the electromagnetic attack obtains at least the same result as power consumption and consequently must be carefuly taken into account. Finally we enumerate countermeasures to be implemented.


electromagnetic and power analysis tamper resistance SEMA DEMA SPA DPA smartcard 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jean-Jacques Quisquater
    • 1
  • David Samyde
    • 1
  1. 1.UCL Crypto Group, Laboratoire de microélectronique (DICE)Université catholique de LouvainLouvain-la-NeuveBelgium

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