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More Efficient Password-Authenticated Key Exchange

  • Philip MacKenzie
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 2020)

Abstract

In this paper we show various techniques for improving the efficiency of the PAK and PAK-X password-authenticated key exchange protocols while maintaining provable security. First we show how to decrease the client-side computation by half in the standard PAK protocol (i.e., PAK over a subgroup of Z p * . Then we show a version of PAK that is provably secure against server compromise but is conceptually much simpler than the PAK-X protocol. Finally we show how to modify the PAK protocol for use over elliptic curve and XTR groups, thus allowing greater efficiency compared to running PAK over a subgroup of Z p * .

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Philip MacKenzie
    • 1
  1. 1.Bell LaboratoriesLucent TechnologiesUSA

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