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The Exact Security of ECIES in the Generic Group Model

  • N. P. Smart
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 2260)

Abstract

In this paper we analyse the ECIES encryption algorithm in the generic group model of computation. This allows us to remove the non-standard interactive intractability assumption of the proof of security given in the literature. This is done at the expense of requiring the generic group model of computation.

Keywords

Elliptic Curve Encryption Scheme Discrete Logarithm Elliptic Curve Cryptography Random Oracle Model 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • N. P. Smart
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of BristolBristolUK

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