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Information Flow Control and Applications — Bridging a Gap —

  • Heiko Mantel
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 2021)

Abstract

The development of formal security models is a difficult, time consuming, and expensive task. This development burden can be considerably reduced by using generic security models. In a security model, confidentiality as well as integrity requirements can be expressed by restrictions on the information flow. Generic models for controling information flow in distributed systems have been thoroughly investigated. Nevertheless, the known approaches cannot cope with common features of secure distributed systems like channel control, information filters, or explicit downgrading. This limitation caused a major gap which has prevented the migration of a large body of research into practice. To bridge this gap is the main goal of this article.

Keywords

Security Property Security Model Security Domain View Versus Extended View 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Heiko Mantel
    • 1
  1. 1.German Research Center for Artificial Intelligence (DFKI)SaarbrückenGermany

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