Permanent Fault Attack on the Parameters of RSA with CRT

  • Sung-Ming Yen
  • SangJae Moon
  • JaeCheol Ha
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 2727)

Abstract

Chinese remainder theorem has been widely employed to speedup the RSA computation. In this paper, one kind of permanent fault attack on RSA with CRT will be pointed out which exploits a permanent fault on the storage of either p or q. This proposed attack is generic and powerful which can be applicable to both the conventional RSA with CRT and Shamir’s fault attack immune design of RSA with CRT. Two popular and one recently proposed CRT recombination algorithms which are necessary for the above two mentioned RSA with CRT will be carefully examined in this paper for their immunity against the proposed parameter permanent fault attack.

Keywords

Chinese remainder theorem (CRT) Computational fault Cryptography Factorization Hardware fault cryptanalysis Permanent fault Physical cryptanalysis Side channel attack 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Sung-Ming Yen
    • 1
  • SangJae Moon
    • 2
  • JaeCheol Ha
    • 3
  1. 1.Laboratory of Cryptography and Information Security (LCIS) Dept of Computer Science and Information EngineeringNational Central UniversityChung-LiTaiwan R.O.C.
  2. 2.Mobile Network Security Technology Research Center (MSRC)Kyungpook National UniversityTaeguKorea
  3. 3.Dept of Computer and InformationKorea Nazarene UniversityChoong NamKorea

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